
Revolution
in Iran seems to happen only in western dreams and media. Protests took
place only in Tehran and a few large cities and are now nearly
disappeared. Smaller towns and rural areas have been very quiet whole
the time after elections. The opposition may not yet have been
defeated, but the problems are much deeper than calming the streets.
The struggle inside ruling elite is continuing and one could estimate
that Iran’s political system is now undergoing a major crisis of
legitimacy over allegations of a fraudulent presidential elections. So
revolution is postponed in this still theocratic state.
Iran
is one of the oldest existing civilizations on globe, its population is
well educated young and big and it owns huge energy resources so the
country can have sustainable success also in future as regional
superpower. From my point of view people in Iran know best how to
develop their country without outside guidance – indeed foreign
interference can only make situation worse as seen in history. However
for foreign countries it is extremely important to try understand
developments in Iran and consider their future cooperation according
that background. From western perspective the key question is if
foreign policy of Iran is changing and if to which direction.
While
U.S. and EU are still looking their positions related postelection
situation in Iran the country itself appears to be caught between
strategies: one that does not want to downgrade diplomatic relations
with other nations for fear of international isolation, and another
that is pushing the concept of foreign interference for domestic
reasons.
U.S. interference
Tehran’s
foreign policy, particularly its policies toward the U.S., has its own
strategic logic, and is based on Iran’s ambitions and Tehran’s
perception of what threatens them.
Iranians
are deeply skeptical about American motives in the Middle East. In
1953, the CIA, with cooperation with Intelligence Service, triggered a
coup that deposed the popular Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq, who had
nationalised Iran’s oil industry, monopolised by the British. Mossadeq
had wanted to nationalise the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in which the
British had a majority share. The British and Americans organised a
coup, put Mossadeq under house arrest and placed Pahlavi firmly in
control as Shah.
Added
to this are the insults and damages that the United States has
inflicted on Iran over the past two-and-a-half decades. Iranians will
never forget that the United States tilted toward Iraq in the Iran-Iraq
war. By all accounts, Iran would have won the war if the United States
had not interfered. Moreover, it is widely known that the United States
provided poison gas and other chemical weapons to Iraq during that
conflict.
Behind
the soothing rhetoric of “the promotion of democracy “, Washington’s
actions aim to impose regimes that are opening their markets to the US
without conditions and which are aligning themselves to their foreign
policy claims Thierry Meyssan, a journalist and chairperson of Voltaire Network. Meyssan describes in his article “Color revolution fails in Iran”
- two of U.S. tools for democracy promotion related also to Iran
namely the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), created in 1982 and
the United States Institute for Peace (USIP) in 1984; both of these
institutions are organically intertwined. I quote:
Legally
the NED is a not-for-profit organization under US law, financed by an
annual grant voted by Congress as part of the State Department budget.
In order to operate, this organization is co-financed by the US Agency
for International Development (USAID), which is part of the State
Department. This legal structure is used jointly as a cover by the
American CIA, the British MI6 and the Australian ASIS (and occasionally
by Canadian and New Zealand secret services).
The
NED presents itself as an agency promoting democracy. It intervenes
either directly or using one of its four tentacles: one designed to
subvert unions, the second responsible for corrupting management
organizations, the third for left-wing parties and the fourth for
right-wing parties.
The
operation conducted in 2009 in Iran belongs to the long list of pseudo
revolutions. First, a 400 million dollar budget was voted in 2007 by
Congress to orchestrate a « regime change » in Iran. This was in
addition to the ad hoc budgets of the NED, the USAID, the CIA & Co.
How this money is being used is unclear, but the three main recipients
are the following: the Rafsanjani family, the Pahlavi family and the
People’s Mujahedin of Iran. "Another is the presence in the UK of the
Iranian opposition group MKO." The MKO is the People's Mujahedin
Organisation, which was taken off the list of terrorist groups by the
EU in January.

Western manuscript – Restore Monarchy project
What
was the practical plan to change regime in Iran? One quite well based
option is described by William O.Beeman in an article “Washington might have picked Iran’s future king and premier” -published
in Iran Press Service. Of course IPS can be seen as biased media but
the script shows how western interference can be seen from Iran’s
perspective. Anyway Mr. Beeman is a writer and professor of
anthropology at The University of Minnesota and he describes western
script for regime change in Iran as follows:
The
form of government would be a Constitutional Monarchy, with the Head of
State being Reza Pahlavi, son of the former Shah, Mohammad Reza
Pahlavi, who was deposed in the 1978-79 Islamic revolution, and Sohrab
Sobhani as his Prime Minister. The Bush Administration apparently has a
handpicked American "plumber" ready to go in Iran, much like Ahmed
Chalabi (the leader of the Defence Department-backed Iraqi National
Congress) in Iraq. This is Sohrab "Rob" Sobhani, an Iranian-American
associated with the neoconservatives in Washington. With Reza Pahlavi
as Shah, the 40-ish Sobhani would presumably be prime minister or
president.
The
promoter of the Administration policy is American Enterprise Institute
Freedom Chair Holder Michael Ledeen - one of four advisers in regular
consultation with White House strategist, Karl Rove. ledeen and
Sobhani recently established the Coalition for Democracy in Iran (CDI)
to promote this regime change.
Reza
Pahlavi had been living quietly in Maryland until 11 September, when he
began to address the Iranian community via the internet and satellite
television. This prompted the Iranian community to dub him the
"Internet Prince." Rob Sobhani, who has known Reza Pahlavi since
childhood, was actually born in Kansas. He became a specialist in
energy policy. He has had his finger in many pies in Washington,
including consultation on the construction of an oil and gas pipeline
across Afghanistan. Sobhani’s interests in regime change are very clear
and very consonant with American desires. They are largely commercial.
Following his graduation from Georgetown, he became head of a Caspian
Energy Consulting, a firm dealing with the transport and sale of
Caspian oil. He also notes that supporting a secularisation of Iran
would lead to easier transport of Caspian oil through Iranian territory.
Sobhani
also sees secularisation of Iran as beneficial for Israel. This is not
surprising, since Israel and Iran had excellent ties before the 1978-79
Islamic Revolution. The Iranian Jewish community is the oldest
continuous Jewish community in the world. The community is as prominent
in Diaspora as in Iran, with members in powerful positions in the
Israeli government and in American life, particularly in California.
Elimination of the clerical regime in Iran would eliminate support for
(the Iran-backed Lebanese) Hezbollah. It might even lead to renewed
trade between Tehran and Tel Aviv.
Ledeen
and Sobhani expect to have the coup first, and then present Reza
Pahlavi as the emergent ruler. Ledeen said as much in a rally in Los
Angeles for Iranian monarchists, saying in effect: Let’s have the
revolution first, then worry about who will rule Iran. What Ledeen, who
has never traveled to Iran, and Sobhani don’t understand is that for
such an operation to work, it cannot be tied to an overt embracing of a
restoration of the Monarchy (remembering the CIA engineered
counter-coup in 1953 that created an American puppet regime in Iran
until 1979). Moreover, it cannot specifically espouse use of the
Mojahedeen Khalq Organisation (MKO), the guerrilla movement opposing
the Iranian government from Iraq. Both the Pahlavi regime and the
Mojahedeen are widely opposed in Iran, even from people who would like
to see clerical rule eliminated. To have Reza Pahlavi return to power
with American blessing would, for many Iranians, be a continuation of
American interference in Iranian affairs.
Change in foreign policy – western view?
European diplomats had meeting on 1st
July 2009 but they made no formal decision to order their envoys home,
however this measure was an option as the European Union — Iran’s
biggest trading partner — tried to work out how to defuse the dispute
in a way that would shield other embassies in Tehran from similar
action (detention of the British Embassy’s Iranian personnel). A
high-ranking Iranian military official demanded that the Europeans
apologize for interference in Iran’s affairs, which, he said,
disqualified European countries from negotiating on Iran’s nuclear
program. The official, Maj. Gen. Hassan Firouzabadi, the armed forces
chief of staff, was quoted by the semiofficial Fars news agency as
saying that because of the European Union’s “interference” in the
postelection unrest, the bloc had “totally lost the competence and
qualifications needed for holding any kind of talks with Iran.” (Source
NYT)
In
an interview with The New York Times, a day before his scheduled
departure for Moscow on Sunday, Mr. Obama said he had “grave concern”
about the arrests and intimidation of Iran’s opposition leaders, but
insisted, as he has throughout the Iranian crisis, that the repression
would not close the door on negotiations with the Iranian government.
“We’ve got some fixed national security interests in Iran not
developing nuclear weapons, in not exporting terrorism, and we have
offered a pathway for Iran to rejoining the international community,”
Mr. Obama said. (US) The administration, meanwhile, has been preparing
for two opposite possibilities: One in which the Iranian leadership
seeks to regain a measure of legitimacy by taking up Mr. Obama’s offer
to talk — a situation that could put Washington in the uncomfortable
position of giving credibility to a government whose actions Mr. Obama
has deplored — or one in which Iran rejects negotiations. In comments
on the CBS News program “Face the Nation,” Admiral Mullen (the chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) seemed to underscore the Pentagon’s
concern that an Israeli strike could start a broader conflict, and
might simply drive the Iranian nuclear efforts deeper underground. He
said any strike on Iran could be “very destabilizing — not just in and
of itself but the unintended consequences of a strike like that.”
(Source NYT)
Israeli
leaders have not asked the United States for approval to attack Iran
for fear Washington will turn them down, according to a news report on
July 7, 2009 in The Washington Times. Two unnamed Israeli officials
close to Benjamin Netanyahu said the prime minister is concerned the
White House would not approve an Israeli request to launch military
strikes on Iran's nuclear program. "There was a decision not to press
this because it was probably inadequate for the engagement policy and
what we know about Obama's approach to Iran," one of the officials told
the Washington Times.

There
are some who believe Bush's mistake was not to have shifted his aim
eastward: that if he was looking for an oil-rich state in the Persian
Gulf with links to terrorism and dreams of weapons of mass destruction
then Iran, not Iraq, should have been his target. That kind of talk
makes others nervous. They fear that the US might one day repeat the
Iraq calamity, with the ayatollahs cast in the role of Saddam Hussein.
Russian
President Dmitry Medvedev said Sunday that Moscow supports US
Administration's plan to hold direct talks with Iran.Medvedev told
reporters that the talks would prepare ground for US to discuss its
concerns.
Referring to the countries rights to gain nuclear technology for
civilian utility, Medvedev said that producing nuclear energy within
the framework of the international regulations and the IAEA must not be
considered problematic. The Russian president drew a line between the
Iranian nuclear program and that of North Korea and said that Iranian
nuclear program is underway while interacting with international
bodies, the Islamic republic news agency reported. "North Korea has cut
its contacts with the outside world," the Russian president said
expressing his concern about the North Korean test-firing missiles.
(Source Farsnes)
Energy aspect
Putting
democracy and civil rights aside for a while the economical aspect has
been and is maybe the most important while foreign powers are looking
their positions with Iran. As the world’s fourth-highest oil and gas
producer Iran can have good economical growth, petrochemical revenues
account some 80 % of Iran’s export earnings, much of this income is
used to public spending and subsidies (energy subsidies amount to about
17.5 % of GPD according IMF) while a lack of domestic refining capacity
means that Iran imports around 40% of its petrol. Iran boasts the
biggest reserves of natural gas in the Middle East but its consumption
is also high, behind only the US and Russia. EU and Russia have big
interests where this gas will be exported. More about this e.g. in my
article “Is it time to bury Nabucco?”

As
mentioned earlier privatization of energy sector and transportation
routes were a priority in US blueprint “restore Monarchy”. Also during
the last electoral campaign, Rafsanjani required Mir-Hossain Mousavani,
his former adversary, to promise he would privatize the oil sector.
Iran’s
plans to develop nuclear energy facilities has been crucial factor with
Iran’s international relations. Russia has been helping Iran with the
construction of the nuclear facility in the southern port city of
Bushehr under a contract signed in 1995. Bushehr power plant started
its pre-commissioning stage in the presence of Iranian and Russian
nuclear experts in February 2009. Tehran and Moscow planning to expand
nuclear cooperation in future. (Source Irannewsdaily)
Color revolution postponed
Thierry Meayssan hits the nail on the head in his article “Color revolution fails in Iran” giving following description:
“
Color revolutions” are to revolutions what Canada Dry is to beer. They
look like the real thing, but they lack the flavor. They are regime
changes which appear to be revolutions because they mobilize huge
segments of the population but are more akin to takeovers, because they
do not aim at changing social structures. Instead they aspire to
replace an elite with another, in order to carry out pro-American
economic and foreign policies. The “green revolution” in Tehran is
the latest example of this trend. Behind the soothing rhetoric of “the
promotion of democracy”, Washington’s actions aim to impose regimes
that are opening their markets to the US without conditions and which
are aligning themselves to their foreign policy. However, while these
goals are known by the leaders of the “color revolutions”, they are
never discussed and accepted by the mobilized demonstrators. In the
event when these takeovers succeed, citizens soon rebel against the new
policies imposed on them, even if it is too late to turn back. Besides,
how can opposition groups who sold their country to foreign interests
behind their populations’ backs be considered “democratic”?
When
post-election riots started the Western media relied on its reporters
covering the mass demonstrations of opposition supporters, ignoring and
downplaying the huge turnout for Ahmadinejad. Worse still, the Western
media ignored the class composition of the competing demonstrations –
the fact that the Ahmadinejad was drawing his support from the far more
numerous poor working class, peasant, artisan and public employee
sectors while the bulk of the opposition demonstrators was drawn from
the upper and middle class students, business and professional class.
The most news coverage came from Tehran via English speaking students
ignoring the provinces, small and medium size cities and villages where
Ahmadinejad has his mass base of support (more in pre-election survey).
While the opposition’s supporters were students easily mobilized for
street activities Ahmadinejad’s support drew on the majority of working
youth and household women workers who would express their views at the
ballot box and had little time or inclination to engage in street
politics. Ahmadinejad did very well in the oil and chemical producing
provinces. This may reflect energy sector workers’ opposition to the
reformist plans privatize public enterprises. The great majority of
voters for the incumbent probably felt that national security
interests, the integrity of the country and the social welfare system,
with all of its faults and excesses, could be better defended and
improved with Ahmadinejad than with upper-class technocrats supported
by Western-oriented privileged youth who prize individual life styles
over community values and solidarity.
Mohsen M.Milani, University of South Florida/political science department, estimates that
Unless
there is a fundamental change in the existing structural configuration
of the Islamic Republic, or in a change in the institution of the
Supreme Leader, it is unlikely that Iran will radically change its
foreign policy. If anything, the next president of Iran is likely to
rely increasingly on nationalistic sentiments in order to bring harmony
to a divided, dynamic and assertive Iranian electorate. The Islamic
Constitution was deliberately structured to insure that the unelected
component of the government, or its Islamic part, dominates its elected
or the republican part.
A summary below made by BBC describes good today’s ruling system in Iran:

Tehran’s
top priority is the survival of the Islamic Republic as it exists now.
The strategic direction of the Islamic Republic of Iran has always been
determined by the Supreme Leader, in consultation with the main centers
of power in Iran’s highly factionalized polity. As the second most
powerful man in the country, the Iranian president has profound impact
on strategy and policy, but the Supreme Leader — Ayatollah Ali Khamenei
— is the final “decider.” As the country’s most powerful figure, he is
the commander of the armed forces and in charge of the intelligence and
security forces and serves for life. He — not the president — makes the
key decisions regarding war and peace, Iran’s nuclear policies, and
relations with Washington. The Islamic Constitution was deliberately
structured to insure that the unelected component of the government, or
its Islamic part, dominates its elected or the republican part.
One
aspect that something is changing inside Iran’s power structure is that
the opponents of new elite is making mass-scale money transfers from
Iran. European security experts, speaking on the condition of anonymity
because they were not authorized to discuss the matter publicly,
confirmed reports in Italian and Turkish newspapers that large sums of
money had been sent to havens outside the country from banks controlled
by the Revolutionary Guards.
Ahmadinejad’s
success in last election is strenghtening a process begun in June
2005, with his first election as president. Slowly he is making power
swift from clerics of Qom to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps
(IRGC), particularly the veterans of the Iran-Iraq war. Revolutionary
Guards have seized ownership of Iranian revolution from the clerics,
whom they accused of being weak-willed opportunists and corrupted
hypocrites.
From discussion forums a couple of opinions maybe are expressing also wider mood in today’s Iran:
However
under Ahmadinejad I see that we have a president who will not take
insults from anyone or any country, this makes me and millions of other
Iranians very happy.
I
have no doubt, he also did an excellent job standing up to the world
war criminals, thieves, liars and hypocrites. My only dilemma is
accepting the way ordinary citizens & protestors on the streets
were treated.
Bottom line
Abbas Barzegar concludes the post election outcome quite good in his article “Media fantacies in Iran” as follows:
Soon,
Iran will fade from the news cycle and its horrors will blend with
those of the rest of the world. Ahmadinejad will serve four years as a
lame-duck president, tempered by Khamenei domestically and
internationally. Mousavi, along with Khatami, will probably retire from
politics while Rafsanjani secures his assets as quickly as possible.
(Ali) Larijani (Parliament Speaker) will be the supreme leader’s new
man and after leading the charge on election reform will probably be
the next president.
The
West cannot afford to ignore any regime in Iran - there are a number
of issues that one just has to negotiate with the current Iranian
regime such as the nuclear programme, regional security and
economy-related problems
Professor
Ali Ansari, a noted authority on the country, predicts that a regime
that now "suffers from a serious domestic legitimacy problem – and
which knows it – will seek a foreign foe, something to rally the
country around." He predicts "acts of provocation", and only hopes
Israel is wise enough not to take the bait.
The
worst thing for foreign powers – excluding Israel’s airstrike and all
its consequences - is to come out in open support of opposition
demonstrations – as the Bush administration did so recklessly in 2003,
forcing reformist leaders and opposition politicians to shun protesters
for fear of being denounced as traitors. Same action today would be
fatal for Mousavi and the current Iranian opposition.
The
best thing the United States and EU could do is to re-establish
diplomatic relations with Iran, get involved with commercial dealings,
and give the Iranians some reason to undertake reforms a better life
in partnership with the West. From other side Russia has long-term
interests in Central Eurasia and with Iran it will continue to
implement large-scale economic projects so Iran’s partnership with
Russia can also create economical base for Iran’s reforms. In time, the
younger generation, which makes up more than 75 percent of the
population, will take over the system which now is on developing stage.

Related articles:
“No revolution but potential for change anyway” by Ari Rusila
“Iran-Twitter-Revolution” by Ari Rusila
“Where will the power lie in Iran?” By New York Times
“Iran: the new elite” by Vladimir Yurtayev