EU external relations

Will Negotiation Slot for Kosovo be used?

When UN made new Kosovo related decision on September 2010 it was believed that resolution would enable a dialogue for resolving this frozen conflict. With minimal preconditions new direct talks between Belgrad and Pristina and a possible deal between local stakeholders could open the way for sustainable solution. However resent events have have resulted in stalemate: President of separatist Kosovo government resigned and dissolution of the government itself have put the focus in Kosovo on next elections which will be held in December 2010. Meanwhile also Serbia starts soon preparations for its next next elections, due by spring 2012.

Thus there is a narrow negotiation slot between the time when a new Kosovo government takes office and to end successfully before the Serbian election campaign makes any compromise impossible. The core question is if there is political will to start talks with the aim of reaching as comprehensive a compromise settlement as possible.

Serbs and Albanians have been in negotiations and talks half a dozen times over the past two decades - from the tentative efforts of the 1990s to the doomed talks in Rambouillet, France, in 1999 and the later “status” talks between 2005 (Ahtisaari's pseudo-talks) and 2007 (“Troika” led talks). None of these has led to tangible results and left outsiders imposing an outcome, be it NATO intervention or proposing the Ahtisaari plan.

The original or better to say official aim of international community was to build “standards before status”, on 2005 the task was seen impossible so the slogan changed to “standards and status”. Even this was unrealistic so Feb. 2008 “European”standards were thrown away to garbage and “status without standards” precipitately accepted by western powers. For international community I don’t see any success story with this backward progress. Thus the multi-ethnic idea is far away despite EU’s billions. The remaining Serbs in Kosovo are barricaded into enclaves keeping their lives mainly with help of international KFOR troops or in de facto separated Serb majority region in North Kosovo. This has changed former multi-ethnic province more mono-ethnic one.


New elements in new talks

The new situation has forced also International Crisis Group (ICG) to admit the defeat of its Kosovo policy recommendations during last decade. ICG has acted as informal extension of U.S. State Department however pretending to be neutral mediator and think tank. During earlier “status” negotiations 2005 it endorsed preconditions before talks and afterwards supported sc Ahtisaari plan. Now in their new analysis ”Kosovo and Serbia after the ICJ Opinion”  ICG sees Kosovo's partition with land swap one of possible solutions during coming talks between Belgrad and Pristina. ICG notes that Pristina will not accept partition but gives some hints it might consider trading the heavily Serb North for the largely Albanian-populated parts of the Preševo Valley in southern Serbia. The (dead) Ahtisaari plan and expanded autonomy for North Kosovo are the other two conceivable solutions according ICG.

The fact on the ground is that northern part of Kosovo is integrated to Serbia like it always has been, as well those parts south of Ibar river, which are not ethnically cleansed by Kosovo Albanians. Serbia still runs municipalities, courts, police, customs and public services, and the EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) has been unable to deploy more than a token presence there.

Besides the status, autonomy degree of Northern Kosovo (or its also formal integration with Serbia) the third key question during planned talks is the security of the Serbian Orthodox Church’s most venerable monasteries and churches. The Church, fearful of a repeat of the March 2004 mob violence that left many religious sites in smoking ruins, wants more than extensive protection promised in the Ahtisaari plan; extra-territoriality, treaty guarantees and protection by an international force after NATO-led peacekeepers (KFOR) leave could be solution.

However question of returns seems not be in priority list any more. During Nato bombings some 200.000 Serbs and some thousands of Roma were expelled from there to northern Serb-dominated part of province or to Serbia and due the security problems or economical reasons they have not returned or are not even planing to come back to their (destroyed) homes.


Kosovo or EU

European Union must be united in its demands that Serbia must first recognize Kosovo as an independent country if it is to be granted membership, suggest Martti Ahtisaari, Wolfgang Ischinger and Albert Rohan. “Only a united position of the European Union, combined with the statement that Serbia’s membership in the European Union is impossible until this problem is solved in its entirety, could result in a change of positions, both among ordinary Serbs and within their government,” write the three diplomats. The three also warn that the current calm in Kosovo is not sustainable until Serbia is forced to recognize Kosovo. “No one should be deceived by the current relative calmness in Kosovo. The last tragedies in the Balkans have shown that unresolved problems sooner or later turn into open conflicts,” write the diplomats. (Source Serbianna)

I have my – not so well-disposed - opinion about Mr. Ahtisaari and his negotiation skills related to Kosovo. Instead repairing his earlier mistakes EU in my opinion should start to distance itself from U.S. cowboy policy. Now many Europeans realize they were hoodwinked into recognizing Kosovo’s independence on the pretence it would resolve problems and bring peace – it didn't happen; a new approach is needed.


Would Serbia be prepared to trade sovereignty over Kosovo for membership of the EU? Not according to a Gallup poll in which 70% opposed the suggestion that Serbia relinquish its claim over its southern province in return for joining the EU. About the same proportion felt that Kosovo ‘has to remain a part of Serbia’ and said that Serbia would never recognise Kosovo. At the same time, a relative majority of 43% seemed resigned to accept that Kosovo would be independent one day, regardless of what Serbia did to prevent it. In other poll a total of 74.5 percent Kosovo Albanians supported the idea of forming a single state which would be inhabited by ethnic Albanians, and 47.3 percent believe this ambition would be realized soon. Albanians today also live in north-western Greece , western Macedonia , southern Serbia and southern Montenegro.

From other side Kosovo cannot even begin the EU accession process because five EU member states do not recognise its independence.


What's the local opinion

A Gallup survey revealed growing disillusion with the new status among those who had been so hopeful. When Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia in February 2008 there was great optimism among the territory’s ethnic Albanians, if not among ethnic Serbs. Although three-quarters of Kosovo Albanians said they felt independence had been a good thing, this was considerably fewer than the 93% who had greeted the unilateral declaration of independence in 2008. Ethnic Serbs, meanwhile, became yet more convinced that independence had been a mistake: 80% said it was a ‘bad thing’ in 2009, compared to 74% a year earlier.

Despite being less positive in 2009 that Kosovo's independence was a good thing, almost half (48%) of Kosovo Albanians said things in the country were going in a good direction. Hardly any Kosovo Serbs agreed that the country was going in a good direction (2% vs. 86% who disagreed).


Doubts also grew within both communities about the possibility of peaceful coexistence. In 2008, over seven out of ten Kosovo Albanians had said that they could live peacefully with ethnic Serbs. This fell to six out of ten in 2009. Kosovo Serbs, always sceptical on the question, became even more so: in 2008, 17% thought peaceful coexistence was possible, but by 2009 this had shrunk to 12%. (Source: Focus On Kosovo Independence)


In Kosovo, meanwhile, the International Civilian Representative and EU Special Representative has a thankless task: neither of the territory’s two largest ethnic groups is convinced of the benefits of an international presence. In the 2009 Gallup poll more ethnic Serbs and ethnic Albanians saw no need for an International Civilian Representative/EU Special Representative, rather than thought it necessary. A considerable number of ethnic Albanians nevertheless expressed support for the work being done by the EULEX mission for maintaining stability and security in the disputed territory. Kosovo Serbs, by contrast, were dismissive of its role.


The bottom line

The international community should facilitate as complete a settlement as is possible, leaving it up to the parties themselves to decide how far and in what direction they can go to achieve sustainable compromise. According ICG “The most controversial outcome that might emerge from negotiations would be a Northern Kosovo-Preševo Valley swap in the context of mutual recognition and settlement of all other major issues”. As I have propagated this outcome as pragmatic solution for years I have nothing against to this result, at least it with nearly all aspects is better than situation today and prospects for future. On the other hand stagnation with Kosovo case paralyses regional progress too.

A slight risk – according some international observers - may be that border changes could provoke mass migration by Kosovo Serbs now living south of the Ibar, as well as destabilizing separatism in neighboring Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. However from my viewpoint migration from enclaves is already ongoing, Macedonia has developed practice to copy with separatism and Bosnia is destabilising due internal reasons without outside help.

Officially (UNSC resolution1244) Kosovo is international protectorate administrated by UN Kosovo mission, practically it is today a pseudo-state with good change to become next “failed” or “captured” state. This time (hopefully and finally) real talks between local stakeholders with unpredicted but possible compromise can end this frozen conflict, but “negotiation slot” is time-wise narrow and should be started to use this winter. Failure to negotiate in the next months would probably freeze the conflict for several years, as the parties entered electoral cycles, during which the dispute would likely be used to mobilize nationalist opinion and deflect criticism of domestic corruption and government failures.


Some of my related articles:
Kosovo after ICJ ruling
Peacemaking – How about solving Conflicts too?My critics due Mr.Ahtisaari’s Nobelprize: Do you hear Mr. Nobel rolling in his grave?and his peace mediation methods: 500.000 bodies or sign! and outcome in Kosovo: Kosovo: Two years of Pseudo-state



IRAN – revolution postponed

Revolution in Iran seems to happen only in western dreams and media. Protests took place only in Tehran and a few large cities and are now nearly disappeared. Smaller towns and rural areas have been very quiet whole the time after elections. The opposition may not yet have been defeated, but the problems are much deeper than calming the streets. The struggle inside ruling elite is continuing and one could estimate that Iran’s political system is now undergoing a major crisis of legitimacy over allegations of a fraudulent presidential elections.  So revolution is postponed in this still theocratic state.

Iran is one of the oldest existing civilizations on globe, its population is well educated young and big and it owns huge energy resources so the country can have sustainable success also in future as regional superpower.  From my point of view people in Iran know best how to develop their country without outside guidance – indeed foreign interference can only make situation worse as seen in history.  However for foreign countries it is extremely important to try understand developments in Iran and consider their future cooperation according that background. From western perspective the key question is if foreign policy of Iran is changing and if to which direction.

While U.S. and EU are still looking their positions related postelection situation in Iran the country itself appears to be caught between strategies: one that does not want to downgrade diplomatic relations with other nations for fear of international isolation, and another that is pushing the concept of foreign interference for domestic reasons.

U.S. interference

Tehran’s foreign policy, particularly its policies toward the U.S., has its own strategic logic, and is based on Iran’s ambitions and Tehran’s perception of what threatens them.

Iranians are deeply skeptical about American motives in the Middle East. In 1953, the CIA, with cooperation with Intelligence Service, triggered a coup that deposed the popular Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq, who had nationalised Iran’s oil industry, monopolised by the British. Mossadeq had wanted to nationalise the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in which the British had a majority share. The British and Americans organised a coup, put Mossadeq under house arrest and placed Pahlavi firmly in control as Shah.

Added to this are the insults and damages that the United States has inflicted on Iran over the past two-and-a-half decades. Iranians will never forget that the United States tilted toward Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war. By all accounts, Iran would have won the war if the United States had not interfered. Moreover, it is widely known that the United States provided poison gas and other chemical weapons to Iraq during that conflict.

Behind the soothing rhetoric of  “the promotion of democracy “, Washington’s actions aim to impose regimes that are opening their markets to the US without conditions and which are aligning themselves to their foreign policy claims Thierry Meyssan, a journalist and chairperson of Voltaire Network.  Meyssan describes in his article “Color revolution fails in Iran” -  two of U.S. tools for democracy promotion related also to Iran namely the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), created in 1982 and the United States Institute for Peace (USIP) in 1984; both of these institutions are organically intertwined. I quote:

Legally the NED is a not-for-profit organization under US law, financed by an annual grant voted by Congress as part of the State Department budget. In order to operate, this organization is co-financed by the US Agency for International Development (USAID), which is part of the State Department. This legal structure is used jointly as a cover by the American CIA, the British MI6 and the Australian ASIS (and occasionally by Canadian and New Zealand secret services).

The NED presents itself as an agency promoting democracy. It intervenes either directly or using one of its four tentacles: one designed to subvert unions, the second responsible for corrupting management organizations, the third for left-wing parties and the fourth for right-wing parties.

The operation conducted in 2009 in Iran belongs to the long list of pseudo revolutions. First, a 400 million dollar budget was voted in 2007 by Congress to orchestrate a « regime change » in Iran. This was in addition to the ad hoc budgets of the NED, the USAID, the CIA & Co. How this money is being used is unclear, but the three main recipients are the following: the Rafsanjani family, the Pahlavi family and the People’s Mujahedin of Iran. "Another is the presence in the UK of the Iranian opposition group MKO." The MKO is the People's Mujahedin Organisation, which was taken off the list of terrorist groups by the EU in January.

Western manuscript – Restore Monarchy project

What was the practical plan to change regime in Iran?  One quite well based option is described by William O.Beeman in an article “Washington might have picked Iran’s future king and premier” -published in Iran Press Service.  Of course IPS can be seen as biased media but the script shows how western interference can be seen from Iran’s perspective.  Anyway  Mr. Beeman is a writer and professor of anthropology at The University of Minnesota and he describes western script for regime change in Iran as follows:

The form of government would be a Constitutional Monarchy, with the Head of State being Reza Pahlavi, son of the former Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who was deposed in the 1978-79 Islamic revolution, and Sohrab Sobhani as his Prime Minister. The Bush Administration apparently has a handpicked American "plumber" ready to go in Iran, much like Ahmed Chalabi (the leader of the Defence Department-backed Iraqi National Congress) in Iraq. This is Sohrab "Rob" Sobhani, an Iranian-American associated with the neoconservatives in Washington. With Reza Pahlavi as Shah, the 40-ish Sobhani would presumably be prime minister or president.

The promoter of the Administration policy is American Enterprise Institute Freedom Chair Holder Michael Ledeen -  one of four advisers in regular consultation with White House strategist, Karl Rove.  ledeen and Sobhani recently established the Coalition for Democracy in Iran (CDI) to promote this regime change.

Reza Pahlavi had been living quietly in Maryland until 11 September, when he began to address the Iranian community via the internet and satellite television. This prompted the Iranian community to dub him the "Internet Prince." Rob Sobhani, who has known Reza Pahlavi since childhood, was actually born in Kansas. He became a specialist in energy policy. He has had his finger in many pies in Washington, including consultation on the construction of an oil and gas pipeline across Afghanistan. Sobhani’s interests in regime change are very clear and very consonant with American desires. They are largely commercial. Following his graduation from Georgetown, he became head of a Caspian Energy Consulting, a firm dealing with the transport and sale of Caspian oil. He also notes that supporting a secularisation of Iran would lead to easier transport of Caspian oil through Iranian territory.

Sobhani also sees secularisation of Iran as beneficial for Israel. This is not surprising, since Israel and Iran had excellent ties before the 1978-79 Islamic Revolution. The Iranian Jewish community is the oldest continuous Jewish community in the world. The community is as prominent in Diaspora as in Iran, with members in powerful positions in the Israeli government and in American life, particularly in California. Elimination of the clerical regime in Iran would eliminate support for (the Iran-backed Lebanese) Hezbollah. It might even lead to renewed trade between Tehran and Tel Aviv.

Ledeen and Sobhani expect to have the coup first, and then present Reza Pahlavi as the emergent ruler. Ledeen said as much in a rally in Los Angeles for Iranian monarchists, saying in effect: Let’s have the revolution first, then worry about who will rule Iran. What Ledeen, who has never traveled to Iran, and Sobhani don’t understand is that for such an operation to work, it cannot be tied to an overt embracing of a restoration of the Monarchy (remembering the CIA engineered counter-coup in 1953 that created an American puppet regime in Iran until 1979). Moreover, it cannot specifically espouse use of the Mojahedeen Khalq Organisation (MKO), the guerrilla movement opposing the Iranian government from Iraq. Both the Pahlavi regime and the Mojahedeen are widely opposed in Iran, even from people who would like to see clerical rule eliminated. To have Reza Pahlavi return to power with American blessing would, for many Iranians, be a continuation of American interference in Iranian affairs.

Change in foreign policy – western view?

European diplomats had meeting on 1st July 2009 but  they made no formal decision to order their envoys home, however  this measure was an option as the European Union — Iran’s biggest trading partner — tried to work out how to defuse the dispute in a way that would shield other embassies in Tehran from similar action (detention of the British Embassy’s Iranian personnel).  A high-ranking Iranian military official demanded that the Europeans apologize for interference in Iran’s affairs, which, he said, disqualified European countries from negotiating on Iran’s nuclear program. The official, Maj. Gen. Hassan Firouzabadi, the armed forces chief of staff, was quoted by the semiofficial Fars news agency as saying that because of the European Union’s “interference” in the postelection unrest, the bloc had “totally lost the competence and qualifications needed for holding any kind of talks with Iran.” (Source NYT)

In an interview with The New York Times, a day before his scheduled departure for Moscow on Sunday, Mr. Obama said he had “grave concern” about the arrests and intimidation of Iran’s opposition leaders, but insisted, as he has throughout the Iranian crisis, that the repression would not close the door on negotiations with the Iranian government. “We’ve got some fixed national security interests in Iran not developing nuclear weapons, in not exporting terrorism, and we have offered a pathway for Iran to rejoining the international community,” Mr. Obama said. (US) The administration, meanwhile, has been preparing for two opposite possibilities: One in which the Iranian leadership seeks to regain a measure of legitimacy by taking up Mr. Obama’s offer to talk — a situation that could put Washington in the uncomfortable position of giving credibility to a government whose actions Mr. Obama has deplored — or one in which Iran rejects negotiations. In comments on the CBS News program “Face the Nation,” Admiral Mullen (the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) seemed to underscore the Pentagon’s concern that an Israeli strike could start a broader conflict, and might simply drive the Iranian nuclear efforts deeper underground. He said any strike on Iran could be “very destabilizing — not just in and of itself but the unintended consequences of a strike like that.” (Source NYT)

Israeli leaders have not asked the United States for approval to attack Iran for fear Washington will turn them down, according to a news report on July 7, 2009 in The Washington Times. Two unnamed Israeli officials close to Benjamin Netanyahu said the prime minister is concerned the White House would not approve an Israeli request to launch military strikes on Iran's nuclear program. "There was a decision not to press this because it was probably inadequate for the engagement policy and what we know about Obama's approach to Iran," one of the officials told the Washington Times.

There are some who believe Bush's mistake was not to have shifted his aim eastward: that if he was looking for an oil-rich state in the Persian Gulf with links to terrorism and dreams of weapons of mass destruction then Iran, not Iraq, should have been his target. That kind of talk makes others nervous. They fear that the US might one day repeat the Iraq calamity, with the ayatollahs cast in the role of Saddam Hussein.

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said Sunday that Moscow supports US Administration's plan to hold direct talks with Iran.Medvedev told reporters that the talks would prepare ground for US to discuss its concerns.
Referring to the countries rights to gain nuclear technology for civilian utility, Medvedev said that producing nuclear energy within the framework of the international regulations and the IAEA must not be considered problematic. The Russian president drew a line between the Iranian nuclear program and that of North Korea and said that Iranian nuclear program is underway while interacting with international bodies, the Islamic republic news agency reported. "North Korea has cut its contacts with the outside world," the Russian president said expressing his concern about the North Korean test-firing missiles. (Source Farsnes)

Energy aspect

Putting democracy  and civil rights aside for a while the economical aspect has been and is maybe the most important while foreign powers are looking their positions with Iran. As the world’s fourth-highest oil and gas producer Iran can have good economical growth, petrochemical revenues account some 80 % of Iran’s export earnings, much of this income is used to public spending and subsidies (energy subsidies amount to about 17.5 % of GPD according IMF) while a lack of domestic refining capacity means that Iran imports around 40% of its petrol. Iran boasts the biggest reserves of natural gas in the Middle East but its consumption is also high, behind only the US and Russia.  EU and Russia have big interests where this gas will be exported.  More about this e.g. in my article “Is it time to bury Nabucco?


As mentioned earlier privatization of energy sector and transportation routes were a priority in US blueprint “restore Monarchy”.  Also during the last electoral campaign, Rafsanjani required Mir-Hossain Mousavani, his former adversary, to promise he would privatize the oil sector.

Iran’s plans to develop nuclear energy facilities has been crucial factor with Iran’s international relations. Russia has been helping Iran with the construction of the nuclear facility in the southern port city of Bushehr under a contract signed in 1995. Bushehr power plant started its pre-commissioning stage in the presence of Iranian and Russian nuclear experts in February 2009. Tehran and Moscow planning to expand nuclear cooperation in future. (Source Irannewsdaily)

Color revolution postponed

Thierry Meayssan hits the nail on the head in his article “Color revolution fails in Iran”  giving following description:

“ Color revolutions” are to revolutions what Canada Dry is to beer. They look like the real thing, but they lack the flavor. They are regime changes which appear to be revolutions because they mobilize huge segments of the population but are more akin to takeovers, because they do not aim at changing social structures. Instead they aspire to replace an elite with another, in order to carry out pro-American economic and foreign policies. The  “green revolution”  in Tehran is the latest example of this trend.  Behind the soothing rhetoric of “the promotion of democracy”, Washington’s actions aim to impose regimes that are opening their markets to the US without conditions and which are aligning themselves to their foreign policy. However, while these goals are known by the leaders of the “color revolutions”, they are never discussed and accepted by the mobilized demonstrators. In the event when these takeovers succeed, citizens soon rebel against the new policies imposed on them, even if it is too late to turn back. Besides, how can opposition groups who sold their country to foreign interests behind their populations’ backs be considered “democratic”?

When post-election riots started the Western media relied on its reporters covering the mass demonstrations of opposition supporters, ignoring and downplaying the huge turnout for Ahmadinejad. Worse still, the Western media ignored the class composition of the competing demonstrations – the fact that the Ahmadinejad was drawing his support from the far more numerous poor working class, peasant, artisan and public employee sectors while the bulk of the opposition demonstrators was drawn from the upper and middle class students, business and professional class.  The most news coverage came from Tehran via English speaking students ignoring the provinces, small and medium size cities and villages where Ahmadinejad has his mass base of support (more in pre-election survey).

While the opposition’s supporters were students easily mobilized for street activities Ahmadinejad’s support drew on the majority of working youth and household women workers who would express their views at the ballot box and had little time or inclination to engage in street politics. Ahmadinejad did very well in the oil and chemical producing provinces. This may reflect energy sector workers’ opposition to the reformist plans privatize public enterprises.  The great majority of voters for the incumbent probably felt that national security interests, the integrity of the country and the social welfare system, with all of its faults and excesses, could be better defended and improved with Ahmadinejad than with upper-class technocrats supported by Western-oriented privileged youth who prize individual life styles over community values and solidarity.

Mohsen M.Milani, University of South Florida/political science department, estimates that

Unless there is a fundamental change in the existing structural configuration of the Islamic Republic, or in a change in the institution of the Supreme Leader, it is unlikely that Iran will radically change its foreign policy. If anything, the next president of Iran is likely to rely increasingly on nationalistic sentiments in order to bring harmony to a divided, dynamic and assertive Iranian electorate. The Islamic Constitution was deliberately structured to insure that the unelected component of the government, or its Islamic part, dominates its elected or the republican part.

A summary below made by BBC describes good today’s ruling system in Iran:

Tehran’s top priority is the survival of the Islamic Republic as it exists now. The strategic direction of the Islamic Republic of Iran has always been determined by the Supreme Leader, in consultation with the main centers of power in Iran’s highly factionalized polity. As the second most powerful man in the country, the Iranian president has profound impact on strategy and policy, but the Supreme Leader — Ayatollah Ali Khamenei — is the final “decider.” As the country’s most powerful figure, he is the commander of the armed forces and in charge of the intelligence and security forces and serves for life. He — not the president — makes the key decisions regarding war and peace, Iran’s nuclear policies, and relations with Washington. The Islamic Constitution was deliberately structured to insure that the unelected component of the government, or its Islamic part, dominates its elected or the republican part.

One aspect that something is changing inside Iran’s power structure is that the opponents of new elite is making mass-scale money transfers from Iran. European security experts, speaking on the condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to discuss the matter publicly, confirmed reports in Italian and Turkish newspapers that large sums of money had been sent to havens outside the country from banks controlled by the Revolutionary Guards.

Ahmadinejad’s success in last  election is strenghtening a process begun in June 2005, with his first election as president. Slowly he is making power swift from clerics of Qom to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), particularly the veterans of the Iran-Iraq war. Revolutionary Guards have seized ownership of Iranian revolution from the clerics, whom they accused of being weak-willed opportunists and corrupted hypocrites.

From discussion forums a couple of opinions maybe are expressing also wider mood in today’s Iran:

However under Ahmadinejad I see that we have a president who will not take insults from anyone or any country, this makes me and millions of other Iranians very happy.

I have no doubt, he also did an excellent job standing up to the world war criminals, thieves, liars and hypocrites. My only dilemma is accepting the way ordinary citizens & protestors on the streets were treated.

Bottom line

Abbas Barzegar concludes the post election outcome quite good in his article  “Media fantacies in Iran” as follows:

Soon, Iran will fade from the news cycle and its horrors will blend with those of the rest of the world. Ahmadinejad will serve four years as a lame-duck president, tempered by Khamenei domestically and internationally. Mousavi, along with Khatami, will probably retire from politics while Rafsanjani secures his assets as quickly as possible. (Ali) Larijani (Parliament Speaker)  will be the supreme leader’s new man and after leading the charge on election reform will probably be the next president.

The West cannot afford to ignore any regime in Iran -  there are a number of issues that one just has to negotiate with the current Iranian regime such as the nuclear programme, regional security and economy-related problems

Professor Ali Ansari, a noted authority on the country, predicts that a regime that now "suffers from a serious domestic legitimacy problem – and which knows it – will seek a foreign foe, something to rally the country around." He predicts "acts of provocation", and only hopes Israel is wise enough not to take the bait.

The worst thing for foreign powers – excluding Israel’s airstrike and all its consequences -  is to come out in open support of opposition demonstrations – as the Bush administration did so recklessly in 2003, forcing reformist leaders and opposition politicians to shun protesters for fear of being denounced as traitors.  Same action today would be fatal for Mousavi and the current Iranian opposition.

The best thing the United States and EU could do is to re-establish diplomatic relations with Iran, get involved with commercial dealings, and give the Iranians some reason to undertake reforms ­ a better life in partnership with the West. From other side Russia has long-term interests in Central Eurasia and with Iran it will continue to implement large-scale economic projects so Iran’s partnership with Russia can also create economical base for Iran’s reforms. In time, the younger generation, which makes up more than 75 percent of the population, will take over the system which now is on developing stage.

Related articles:

No revolution but potential for change anyway” by Ari Rusila

Iran-Twitter-Revolution” by Ari Rusila

Where will the power lie in Iran?” By New York Times

Iran: the new elite” by Vladimir Yurtayev

Balkans: Stop Mastermind – give Change to Locals

In March, Mrs. Clinton – FM/USA - commented in Brussels that the Obama administration was "determined to listen, advise (European Union countries) and through agreement arrive at wise solution to common challenges." Among the "common challenges" was that the "Balkans is in danger of becoming part of the forgotten past." She added the ominous view that "it will not be allowed for unfinished business to remain there."

The US vice president's trip in Balkans on May was again evidence of a lack of European leadership. Biden's visit to Serbia, Kosovo, and, most especially, Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), was necessary due the reason that Europe is still not up to resolving its own security problems. Brussels has lost – if it sometimes had – its vision on Balkans, is divided with Kosovo case and lacks a viable policy toward BiH, leaving Washington to lobby most consistently for the steps that would bring the country into the EU.

Kosovo

A recent panel discussion on the Balkans presented by the Lord Byron Foundation at Toronto's Royal Canadian Military Institute (RCMI), brought together experts on the subject. The panellists agreed that recent moves indicate "reinvigoration" of the former Clinton policies, whereby then-secretary of state Madeleine Albright worked assiduously to go to war on behalf of Kosovo. That was arguably, one of the greatest errors and miscalculations of the Clinton regime. The justification was that Serbs were intent on genocide ofKosovo Albanians when, in fact, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) provoked Serbian reaction, and fabricated massacres.

Since the war al-Qaida and Muslim extremists have flooded into the Balkans: Kosovo, Bosnia, Macedonia. The dreaded spectre of militant Islam in the heart of Europe has become a reality, enhanced by U.S. policy and now apparently revived by Obama.

Now Europeans realize they were hoodwinked into recognizing Kosovo's independence on the pretence it would resolve problems and bring peace.Kosovo case was not unique, like it was introduced into playgrounds of international politics, it was a precedent to numerous separatist movement on globe that violence is the right mean to achieve political aims instead of international law.

Bosnia-Herzegovina

Bosnia- Herzegovina (BiH) is a country whose chronic ethnic divisions have defied one of the most intensive, multilateral nation-building efforts ever attempted. Last year, for the first time since the war ended, there was anxious worry in Sarajevo about renewed conflict. Even if the parties never pick up arms again, BiH risks permanent stagnation, a quite plausible scenario that would put the substantial American investment -- and continuing American interests -- in BiH at risk. Instead of an inevitable EU member, Bosnia is more likely to remain an unwelcome, dysfunctional and divided country, with an aggrieved Bosniak (Muslim) plurality, a frustrated, increasingly defensive Serb entity, and an anxious, existentially threatened Croat population.  More in my article “BosniaCollapsing”.

Mujahedeen batallion in Bosnia War
Mujahedeen batallion in Bosnia War

Bosnia-Herzegovina is on the stage of transition from an international protectorate to one responsible for its own reform dynamics. Scepticism is growing about the EU's capacity to facilitate such reform, when the reinforced EU Special representative (EUSR) should replace the Office of the High Representative (OHR).

Leaders of the three strongest national – Serb, Croat, Bosnian Muslim - parties, met on late 2008, after alarming negative EU reports, with the aim of reaching an agreement over several highly disputed issues that are crucial for country’s EU membership, as well as the closure of the Office of the High Representative, OHR. In only two hours, they reached a general agreement on a process of future constitutional changes, questions that would be covered in 2011 census, as well as regulation of the status of the Brcko district and state property. More here.

Deepening talks have continued after this sc Prud Agreement, which will strengthen federation elements while weakening central state power. The Agreement states that Bosnia-Herzegovina is a decentralized country with four—as opposed to the current three—territorial units, while the changes to the Constitution would be discussed in more detail at their future meetings.

The US Vice President Joseph Biden’s visit to Balkans on May 2009 represents the end of the “Dayton phase” of BiH and the beginning of the new phase of upgrading the Dayton Agreement or entering into a new agreement for BiH.

“Do Something…Anything”

Presidend Obama is now in a bit similar situation in Balkans than President Clinton during 90s.Quote from Time: Do Something…Anything, May 3rd, 1993:

All the new options, Clinton acknowledged, "have pluses and minuses," and "all have supporters and opponents in Congress." That is a large part of the President's problem. He is getting plenty of advice, but it is not consistent. He is being pulled and tugged in several directions at once in a * field -- foreign affairs -- for which he does not have his own fingertip instinctiveness. He is being asked to lead where his allies in Europe are reluctant to follow.Clinton feels the strength of the moral argument for action echoing around Washington but is unwilling to start something without knowing how he will end it.

Selection of Mr. Obama brought hope to see some change with US Foreign policy in Balkan too. However when he selected Biden as his vice I went to deep doubts about his judgment. Selecting a man on the record for stating that “all Serbs should be placed in Nazi-style concentration camps” during Senatorial deliberations in 1999 over NATO aggression on Serbia, and that United States ought to conduct a fascist, “Japanese-German style occupation” of Serbia. If Mr. Obama needs help of this kind of redneck so bay bay change.

Some background to U.S. Balkan politics during 90s see e.g.“Beyond Tragedy: NATO’s Intervention in The Former Yugoslavia/Virginia University

My view

It’s said that The Balkans are a graveyard for foreign ambitions. This could be the “lessons learned” to both USA and EU.

Some more sustainable solutions could also be implemented in Western Balkans. Withdrawal of Kosovo recognition can open real negotiations between local stakeholders with unpredicted but possible compromise can end one frozen conflict. Facilitating new Dayton could solve other crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina. With these actions U.S.and Russia together can also restore the authority of UNSC as ultimate forum of international conflict prevention.

The key question from my point of view is whether western Balkans really needs outside advice or not.The other option could be that instead to be the mastermind of Balkan policy the EU and USA should be facilitators for regional initiatives.

More my views one may find from my BalkanBlog!

Russia’s new Security and Energy Initiatives

Two new proposals related to European security and energy cooperation was made last week by Russia.During official state visit in Finland Russia’s President Dimitry Medvedev gave a key note speech in Helsinki on April 20th outlining a “new European security structure”.Same day Russia made public goals and principles of new framework for energy cooperation.


In a speech he delivered in Berlin last June, Medvedev suggested that an "all-European summit" be convened to draft a new security arrangement to govern relations between Russia and the Euro-Atlantic community. He indicated that the new pact should attempt to build on the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. If final product, under Medvedev’s scenario, would be a “Helsinki Plus” agreement that created new guidelines for inter-state relations. 

At the time of Medvedev’s Berlin speech, ties between Russia and the West had already been damaged by NATO’s continued eastward expansion, Washington’s missile defence plans, Moscow’s decision to suspend its participation to the 1990 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, and Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence. The August 2008 Russian-Georgian war and the subsequent Russian-Ukrainian natural gas dispute further strained those relations.

New Security Treaty

In a keynote speech at the University of Helsinki on April 20th 2009, Medvedev also offered another glimpse of his designs for”new European security architecture," first floated in June 2008. Citing well known recent conflicts the Russian president said existing security organizations are no longer capable of guaranteeing Europe's security.

Recalling that 2010 will mark the 35th anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, the President said the future treaty on European Security should be seen a ‘Helsinki plus’ treaty. It should be viewed as the confirmation, continuation and effective implementation of the principles and instruments born out of the Helsinki process, but adapted to the end of ideological confrontation and the emergence of new subjects of international law.

Medvedev also repeated Russia's call for a new security pact to replace NATO, an idea that initially got a cool response when first broached at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's (OSCE) meeting in Helsinki in December. Russia has said NATO is a Cold War relic. It wants a legally binding pact enshrining arms control, a commitment not to use force, and guarantees that no single state or group of states can take a dominant role in the continent's security.

Russia is inviting all states and organizations operating on the European continent to work together to come up with coherent, up-to-date and, most importantly, effective rules of the game. For this work neither NATO nor the EU seems fully appropriate, because there are countries that do not belong to either. The same applies to organizations such as the CIS or CSTO. It could take place at a summit of the OSCE but of course in Russia’s view there is a problem with the OSCE as well. According Russia the OSCE has focussed on solving partial, sometimes even peripheral security issues, and this is not enough. Therefore, Russia proposes another forum which could lead to a productive dialogue among all parties without exception.

The Russian President said the new Euro-Atlantic treaty should replace the imperfect arrangements that are and create an undivided security area encompassing the hemispheric band from Vancouver to Vladivostok. The basic principles in the treaty are compliance with international law, respect of sovereignty, control of arsenals, renunciation of force and resolution of conflicts through peaceful talks.

New Energy Charter

Same day when Medvedev made his key note speech, Russia made public their “Conceptual Approach to the New Legal Framework for Energy Cooperation (Goals and Principles).Russia gave the documents to G8, G20, CIS countries, international organisations, and our neighbouring countries.The conceptual approaches to a new legal base in international energy cooperation consists of three sections, which are

  • The first one contains the international energy cooperation principles, which must be included in the new international legal act.
  • The second section contains elements of an agreement governing [energy] transit, an integral part of which will be an agreement on resolving transit conflicts.
  • The third section contains a list of energy materials and products that Russia suggest applying these legal acts to. So, besides gas or oil, also all other energy products, including nuclear fuel, electricity, coal, and all the other goods traded by in the energy sector.

According Russia it would be advisable to elaborate a new universal international legally binding instrument, which, unlike the existing Energy Charter-based system, would include all major energy-producing (exporting) countries, countries of transit, and energy consumers (importers) as its Parties and cover all aspects of global energy cooperation.The new framework would according Russia create transparency of all international energy market segments production/export, transit, consumption/import.

Updating old or building new? 

The core question for further development of Russia’s security initiative is from which platform start the process.There has been and is different scenarios about this.

USA's long-standing preference for NATO as the transatlantic institution of choice has several explanations. The Alliance has been successful — at least until Afghanistan — and it helped the West win the Cold War without firing a shot. NATO's job, as British Secretary-General Lord Ismay famously put it in 1967, was "to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down." But rather than close up shop with mission accomplished in the early 1990s, the 1949-founded pact sought to find a new purpose.

Then there is the proposal to open NATO to Russia. The Russians favored this option throughout the 1990s and even during Putin's first term in office;today this option seems quite unrealistic.

Yet another option is to resuscitate the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and turn it into a real pan-European security organization. This was one of the ideas back in 1990, when the OSCE (then the CSCE) was still connected with the spirit of the Helsinki process. This is no longer the case. Through neglect and infighting, the OSCE has fallen into tragic disrepair.

EU is a bit question mark as leader of this project. Even if the Lisbon Treaty is ratified this year — a prerequisite for serious EU security policies — the European Union will still need to prove that it can act effectively in the face of crisis.

Realization

Did Russia's so-called Helsinki-plus initiative take a step forward in Helsinki, or not? Finland's chairmanship of the OSCE and the OSCE meeting that was held in Helsinki in December last year stuck closely to the line that the current structures are a good basis for agreement on European security issues.

Despite recent improvements in Russia-EU and Russia-NATO relations, Georgia, Ukraine, the three Baltic States and most Central and Eastern European countries -- all states that view NATO as the main pillar of Europe's security -- remain either openly hostile to, or extremely wary of the Russian security proposal.

By contrast, Azerbaijan and members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization -- a Russian-led regional body that brings together Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan -- support Medvedev's plan.

Bottom line

According Russia the proposals would be discussed at a prospective summit forum in Helsinki, to be called "Helsinki-plus".One summit is however only a tiny part of realization. When the Heads of State and Government of the CSCE met in Helsinki in 1975, the participating States had held more than 2400 meetings in Geneva, and deliberated on 4,660 proposals. So a new pact will require careful work and time.

Since 1975 the map of Europe has changed a lot, the same occurred to problems which today are more complicated and having various global aspects and local variants. From my point of view the international organizations managing security, economical and energy issues have not necessary developed with same scale – some updated structure could be suitable.

Two last decades have been giving many bad practices which – if copied – can make Europe with surrounding regions more unsecure.I think that now it is time at least discuss about lessons learned, develop and copy better practices.Will the outcome be a new structure or updated old one shall be seen but even more important is to start process itself.

Sources and more information:

Medvedev’s key note speech in Helsinki 20th April 2009

Conceptual Approach to the New Legal Framework for Energy Cooperation (Goals and Principles)

Official views from Kremlin

My articles about security policy

“Is GUUAM dead?”

“Could EU lead the 3rd Way out from Confrontation?”

“Powerplay behind the New Cold War”

“EU as a Mediator”

“Stop to Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Nato dreams can start the policy of Détente again”

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Twitter Revolution – Case Moldova

After Orange (Ukraine), Rose (Georgia) and Tulip (Kyrgyzstan) revolutions the first try of next generation demonstration took place in Moldova after last weekends parliamentary elections.Known now as “Twitter Revolution” the protest was self-organized by two youth movements – Hyde Park and ThinkMoldova – using their generation’s tools of social messaging network to gather 10,000-15,000 demonstrators on streets in Moldova’s capital Chisinau, ransacking presidential palace and parliament building.

Background 

As many as 50 per cent of Moldovan eligible voters cast their ballots for the Party of Communists (PCRM). Thus, the ruling party won a landslide victory leaving the other three political parties that made it to parliament far behind. Three other parties managed to pass the 6 per cent threshold required to enter the legislature. All three are in favour of closer ties with the European Union, free-market policies and pursuing NATO membership. The Communists (PCRM) are pro-EU, anti-NATO and less market-friendly.

Election observers from EU and OSCE accepted the voting as fair, though they expressed some concern about interference from the authorities (OSCE report). But the results were a deep disappointment in the capital.Expectation of change was in the air before voting, but that did not happen.

More about elections in my earlier post “Election in Moldova - NATO perspective blocked

Twitter demonstration

According The New York Times the protests apparently started on Monday, when organizers from two youth movements, Hyde Park and ThinkMoldova, began calling for people to gather at an event billed as “I am a not a Communist.”

Natalia Morar, one of the leaders of ThinkMoldova, described the effort on her blog as “six people, 10 minutes for brainstorming and decision-making, several hours of disseminating information through networks, Facebook, blogs, SMSs and e-mails.” She said the protests, organised under the slogan, were organised online: "All the organisation was through the internet, and 15,000 people came on to the street."

The protesters created their own searchable tag - #pman referring Chisinau’s central square - on Twitter, rallying Moldovans to join. Real time communication can be checked from #pman.

Mihai Moscovici 25, who provided updates in English all day over Twitter, painted a more nuanced picture. He said the gathering on Monday night drew only several hundred people. The protesters agreed to gather the next morning and began spreading the word through Facebook and Twitter.When Internet service was shut down, Mr. Moscovici said, he issued updates with his cellphone.

Violence by accident

That demonstration turned to be violent was surprise to activists. Mr. Moscovici said the protests were never intended to turn in that direction. “The situation got beyond any expectations,” he said. “If it would have been planned in advance, they would have used Molotov cocktails or other bad stuff. Today they didn’t have any tools to fight back. The stones they got from the ground, from the pavement.”

Also Ms. Morar of ThinkMoldova distanced her organization from the violence, shifting the blame to opposition parties. ” What bothers her the most, she said, is the suggestion that she and her friends somehow contributed to the violence, which she watched on television. “Believe me, there is nothing at all enjoyable about it,” she said. (Source NYT)


ThinkMoldova — Change Moldova! is a platform dedicated to young people. It is the place where young people directly participate in proposing new ideas and take part in the decisions important for their own future and their country.It is about giving initiative to young people and fights to offer them the possibility to affirm themselves outside of the conventional, hierarchical and parochial institutions prevalent in Moldova’s society and political system.

ThinkMoldova's mission is to create an active and productive dialogue between decision makers, experts and young people. I am sure this kind of platform can attract much more than traditional party youth organizations and example from Moldova shows its effectiveness in politics.

My conclusions

Today’s communication tools are providing new aspects into election campaigns and into politics in general.One of them is that modern technology can inspirit young voters.The second aspect is that the protest does not necessary channel via voting but through street democracy.

One can claim that both of these aspects can include undemocratic elements because majority of population is not familiar with these tools and direct democracy with violence can gain power more than fair share.On the other hand one can claim that the Establishment in such has so strong means to exercise of power that normal elections are insignificant.My position is not clear because situations in every society differ.

One problem is manipulation the media etc. which is common phenomena in political actions as well hijacking a demonstration for purpose of one interest group. In Moldova case the two organizations behind protest condemned the violence and some had opinion that opposition parties were behind these acts. Opposition parties deny this and of course it is possible that the Establishment orchestrated the hooligan part of demonstration to weaken NGOs.  The truth - I don't know.

Use of today’s information possibilities has many ways.  Th!nk About It  blogging campaign is one forum to inspire youth involvement with the 2009 European Parliamentary Elections based mostly discussion and debate in internet.ThinkMoldova gives example how debate can be brought on the street level. We shall see what is the next Think, can it be EU wide and can it motivate crowds to streets or direct actions.

The Moldovan experiment showed that with Twitter some development has made since demonstrations in Ukraine 2004 and Belorussia 2006 which were gathered mainly with SMS. It is practical and effective but from my point of view not sufficient method for democratic revolution. For protest sure, for revolution maybe, sometime, somewhere.

Real time communication related to Moldova can be checked from #pman

More my views one may find from my BalkanBlog!

More about ThinkMoldova

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10th anniversary of Nato’s attack on Serbia

March 24th was held the 10th anniversary of Nato bombings against Serbia.While remembering this intervention I would like to highlight some basic issues before, during and after bombings 1999:

  • Public justification was based to fabricated, manipulated and one-sided reports by U.S. like earlier in Bosnia and after e.g. in Iraq-case.Although reliable figures are beginning to emerge, the final death toll from the Kosovo war remains unknown, and has become the focus of considerable debate. Some Western government and NATO officials suggested during the war, when figures went as high as 100,000;The New York Times reported, "On April 19, the State Department said that up to 500,000 Kosovar Albanians were missing and feared dead. Through its own research, Human Rights Watch documented 3,453 killings by Serbian or Yugoslav government forces. (More in HRW report )
  • The bombings and later orchestrated unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) of Kosovo Albanians were against international law and violation of the UN Charter, Helsinki Accords and a series of UN resolutions including the governing UNSC resolution #1244
  • The big refugee problem started during Nato bombings, after one week from start 300.000 refugees, in April 850.000 refugees. Earlier before -90s Serbs had moved out from Kosovo partly because they felt themselves as discriminated by Albanian majority; during -90s Albanians moved out due the same reason.
  • The actions of the Nato campaign – named as Merciful Angel – were offically Decoydirected toward "interruption of violent attacks being carried out by the Serbian Army and special police forces and the reduction of their capabilities".Nato planes destroyed 4 % of its military targets during bombing – partly because for avoiding own casualties they cowardly launched missiles so high that could not make difference between wooden decoys and real weapons.Instead of military targets the main damage was made against civilian targets.  Nato destroyed e.g. an embassy (China), a prison (Istok), three column of Albanian refugees (81 dead March 13th and 75 April 14th), radio-tv station (Belgrade, 16 civilians dead), a passenger train (Grdelica bridge, 14 dead), also a number of infrastructure, commercial buildings, schools, health institutions, media houses, cultural monuments were damaged or destroyed.Some 2.500 people (mostly civilians) were dead, material civil infrastructure damage is estimated to be some 30 billion dollars.
  • Bombing civilian targets, using cluster and DU (depleted uranium) bombs can be seen as war crimes or at least violations of international law and the Geneva Conventions in particular.
  • Just after bombing Albanians started ethnic cleansing of Serbs under eyes of KFOR peacekeepers who had made “humanitarian intervention”. The vast majority of those people - Serbs, Roma and Gorani - were forced out by ethnic violence and intimidation and still live in dreadful conditions in camps and emergency housing in Serbia.
  • After bombing almost all Albanian refugees have returned while only tiny fraction of Serb refugees – or officially internally displaced persons – have returned to Kosovo. The remaining Serbs in Kosovo are barricaded into enclaves keeping their lives mainly with help of international KFOR troops or in de facto separated Serb majority region in North Kosovo.This has changed former multi-ethnic province more mono-ethnic one.
  • The same ethnic cleansing was repeated March 2004 and again UN Mission in Kosovo was bystander and could not bring perpetrators up for trial. (More in my article “Pogrom with Prize”)
  • The aim of international community was to build “standards before status”,on 2005 the task was seen impossible so the slogan changed to “standards and status”.Even this was unrealistic so Feb. 2008 “European”standards were thrown away to garbage and "status without standards" precipitately accepted by western powers.
  • According western powers the UDI was said to “unique” – instead it serves as precedent to nearly 5.000 ethnic or separatist groups in the world.
  • A state normally needs statehood structures, executive power over own territory and sustainable economy.InKosovo two first elements are on hands of international outsiders and the export of province can cover 5-10 % of import - the rest is covered mainly by international aid and organized crime.
  • The outcome today is a quasi-state with good change to become next “failed” or “captured” state if international community does not firm its grip in province.Today’s Kosovo is already safe-heaven for war criminals,drug traffickers, international money laundry and radical Wahhabists – unfortunately all are also allies of western powers.

Solution?

It’s easy to blame the situation today in Kosovo on U.S foreign policy.After implementing its failed attempt to please Muslim countries, after increasing the profits of its military-industry-complex and after creating one of its biggest military complex in Europe U.S. is covering its track record an leaving he whole mess to its lapdogs in EU.As a result of EU’s short-sighted post-conflict management policy they must again throw away few billions of EU taxpayer money to keep flag in international protectorate and safe haven of drug cartels – in artificial creature with no realistic visions nor exit strategy.

From my point of view the solution could be to finally put that reset button and go go back to Jan 2008.The exit strategy could start by U.S. withdrawing it recognition of Kosovo UDI. After this the real talks between local stakeholders can start without predestined outcome.The compromise can be any of countless different territorial autonomy models, the parties can even create a new one or agree some partition of province.The only important thing forsake of sustainability would be that local parties make the deal and outsiders only facilitate it.This process could also reset the international law, prevent similar violations in future and put focus from old wrongdoings towards future.


More my views in my BalkanBlog!

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